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1 Introduction
Most European universities have, until recently, been controlled by the state, which typ-
ically has paid for the costs of higher education out of general taxation. Students pay
little or no tuition and public institutions usually determine access to higher education
by means of selective exams. Although private universities have long existed, being often
founded by the Catholic Church, the rapid growth in the number of private higher edu-
cation institutions in many Central and Eastern European countries, and also in Greece
and Spain, is a recent phenomenon. The expansion of private education has taken place
in response to high demand for access to higher education and without a rise in public
funding. However, the quality of many of these universities is questionable, and it seems
that private colleges and universities are absorbing the demand in fields in which the cost
of offering instruction is low.1
The market for higher education has some distinctive features that differentiate this
sector from others.2 Firstly, most universities allocate places to students by administra-
tive rationing, using selective exams to determine university admissions. Secondly, the
performance or quality of universities depends positively on the ability of their students,
which makes higher education provision a case of customer-input technology, as described
by Rothschild and White (1995). Moreover, many higher education institutions are non-
profit maximizers and their objectives are sometimes difficult to determine.
The special features of this market may help explain why theoretical contributions
to the analysis of the higher education system are scarce, despite its importance and
the interest of researchers in this topic. In particular, competition among educational
institutions has been the object of study of Del Rey (2001) and De Fraja and Iossa (2002),
in the case of symmetric universities, and Epple and Romano (1998), in the case of public
and private schools. Epple and Romano (1998) obtain that in equilibrium, public schools
have lower quality than private schools. This result follows from the interaction between
an open-enrolment public system and a competitive private sector. Since public schools
are free, students will be willing to attend a private school, which is costly, only if it is
of higher quality than the public school. Although their model features the market for
1See The National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education (1997) and Altbach (1997) for further
evidence.
2Winston (1999) provides an extensive discussion of the main characteristics of the higher education
market.
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primary or secondary education, provided that all student attend a school, their result
may be applied to the US higher education market, in which it is generally the case that
private universities are better than public universities.
In many European countries we observe instead that public universities set very low
or even zero tuition fees but have higher admission standards than private universities.
This paper provides a theoretical framework to explain this phenomenon, focusing in the
characteristics of the European higher education market. We also investigate the conse-
quences of the recent entrance of commercially-run institutions into this market and pose
the following questions: can self-financed private universities compete with public univer-
sities?, why are private universities usually of lower quality than public universities?, and
how the presence of private institutions affect public universities’ qualities and admission
policies?.
The modelling of the university system requires to determine which the higher institu-
tions’ objectives. We consider that public universities aim at maximizing public surplus,
that is, the sum of the earnings of students attending the public university minus the cost
incurred to provide education. Public universities’ costs are covered by general taxation.
Commercial institutions are profit-maximizers. Universities choose optimally their level
of educational quality and use admission requirements and tuition fees to compete for
students.3 Students differ in their unobservable ability and in their income endowment,
and choose whether to attend a university or remain uneducated in order to maximize
their lifetime income. We assume that they cannot borrow against their future income to
invest in higher education. Individuals’ future earnings are increasing in their own ability
and the quality of the university they attend and both inputs are complements in human
capital production. Hence, the return of a given level of educational quality is higher for
high than for low-ability students.
In order to analyze the impact that competition from private universities may have on
public universities’ policies, we first consider an economy in which the only providers of
higher education are public universities. This benchmark is intended to capture the initial
situation in the European higher education market before the expansion of commercial
universities. Under the assumption that quality is fairly homogeneous across public uni-
versities, we can consider that there is only one public institution. We analyze the optimal
3Fernández (1998) and Fernández and Galí (1999) have investigated the properties of markets and
exams as alternative assignment mechanisms under borrowing constraints.
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choices of quality, prices and exams of the public monopoly and we obtain that in equi-
librium, public educational quality depends positively on the mean ability of the student
body. The public institution optimally uses exams to determine admissions and sets a
zero tuition fee. Intuitively, exams are preferred to prices as allocation device because
they select students according to their ability. In the presence of borrowing constraints,
the use of tuition fees limit the admissions of poor and high-ability individuals who are
unable to pay university’s fees. This, in turn, reduces public surplus, which depends
positively on the mean ability of the student body.
Next, we model competition between a public and a private institution. Our main
result is the following: the private institution optimally chooses to provide an educational
quality lower than the one provided publicly. This result may be explained by the different
strategies followed by institutions when competing for students. On the one hand, the
public university is able to behave as a monopoly by means of setting admission standards
and a zero tuition fee. On the other, the private university’s admission policy, based on
tuition fees, makes this institution attractive just to those students of lower ability who
are not accepted into the public university and can afford to pay the private fee. We show
that the presence of a private university in the market involves positive welfare gains
compared to the public monopoly. This is because those students attending the public
institution under monopoly are not affected by competition, and the presence of a private
university allows new students to accede to higher education. This, in turn, increases
total income in the economy.
This paper is closely related to Del Rey and Romero (2004) and Oliveira (2004).
The first paper investigates the strategic role of prices and exams for public and private
institutions competing for students in the presence of borrowing constraints. It also studies
if the process of decentralization of public universities in Europe may be the optimal
response of public universities to increasing competition from private. Oliveira (2004)
analyzes competition between public and private universities in the presence of peer-
group effects and perfect capital markets. She finds two types of equilibria depending
on the parameters of the model, one in which the public university has higher quality
than the private and the other in which the public has lower quality. Our paper differs
from both papers in that educational quality is endogenously determined and is another
decision variable, apart from exams and prices, in the game between the universities. If
universities have an active role in setting tuition fees and exams, then they will be also
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active in choosing the quality of their educational services, so we think that a complete
analysis of university behavior should take into account the quality choice by universities.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a model of the higher education
sector, characterizing the behavior of students and universities as well as the alternative
allocation mechanisms. In Section 3 we analyze the public monopoly benchmark and the
optimal choices made by the public university. Section 4 studies competition between a
public and a private university. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Individuals
The economy consists of a continuum of individuals of measure one. Each individual i
is characterized by a different and unobservable ability, ai, and an initial income endow-
ment, wi, which are uniformly and independently distributed over the interval [0, 1] . An
individual i attending university j obtains utility from his total lifetime income, which
consists of his initial income endowment, wi, and his earnings or accumulated human
capital, hi, minus the tuition fee paid to university j, pj :
U ij = wi − pj + hi. (1)
We assume that earnings are increasing in individual’s ability and university’s educa-
tional quality.4 Educational quality and ability are complements in the determination of
earnings. For simplicity of computations, we assume that human capital has the following
functional form:5
hi = aiQi. (2)
The human capital of uneducated individuals is normalized to zero, h0 = 0, and hence,
a student who does not attend university obtains a utility equal to his initial endowment,
U i0 = wi.
4The positive contribution of own ability to educational attainment is well documented in Hanushek
(1986).
5The specification of the human capital production function does not affect our qualitative results and
allows us to obtain analytical solutions.
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We assume throughout the paper that individuals cannot borrow to invest in higher
education. Although we do not model explicitly the reasons behind this market failure,
moral hazard problems in lending to finance education and the impossibility of human
capital to act as a collateral for loans may be some reasons to close down capital markets.6
This assumption is based on the observation across countries that the majority of students
attending university come from high and middle income classes, which is claimed as the
evidence of credit constraints in financing higher education. In a recent study, Carneiro
and Heckman (2002) conclude that the correlation between income and college attendance
is explained by the existence of long-run rather than short-run credit constraints. In our
model, the predetermined level of income each individual is endowed with, wi, may be
interpreted as the permanent family income and is the main determinant of long-run
credit constraints.
2.2 Universities
We consider that there are two types of universities that provide higher education of
quality Qj, j = b, v, where b and v stand for public and private respectively. Educational
quality may be interpreted as the prestige of the higher education institution.7 Universi-
ties compete for students setting qualities, prices and exams. Firstly, they simultaneously
choose the level of educational quality, secondly, the tuition fee or price for their edu-
cational services and finally, the minimum exam score required to be accepted into the
university.
Universities incur in a cost per student equal to C(Qj), which is increasing and convex
in educational quality, C 0(Qj) > 0 and C 00(Qj) > 0, and has the following functional form:
C(Qj) = αQkj , k > 1, α > 0. (3)
Although universities have the same cost technology, they differ in their objectives.
The public university aims at maximizing public surplus, that is, the difference between
the sum of earnings of students attending the public university, and the costs incurred
6The assumption that individuals cannot borrow at all does not affect our qualitative results that would
also hold in the presence of less severe imperfections in the credit market. However, this assumption allows
us to simplify the model and focus on the effect of borrowing constraints in higher education investments.
7In the education literature, school quality is usually measured by per-student expenditures and by
indicators of the mean ability of the student body.
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to provide education.8 The private institution maximizes profits, that is, the difference
between the revenue obtained from tuition fees pay by admitted students minus the cost
of educating those same students.9
2.3 Allocation Mechanisms
2.3.1 Exams
Universities may use an entry exam to select the best students among those who are
willing to attend the university.10 In order to do so, they establish a minimum score such
that those who obtain a score equal or higher are accepted into the university. We assume
that the exam technology is able to perfectly reveal student’s ability, which means that
there is a one-to-one relationship between the standard of admission and the ability of the
least able student accepted into the university. Let aEj be the ability of the less talented
student admitted to university j. Then, students who obtain a score higher or equal than
the minimum established by the university are those of ability ai ≥ aEj , j = b, v.
2.3.2 Prices
Students may be allocated to schools also by means of prices. This mechanism assigns
students according to their willingness and ability to pay. The university price pj deter-
mines the type of students (characterized by their ability and income) who are willing
and able to enrol the university, given quality Qj. Since student’s ability and educational
quality are complements in the production of human capital, the marginal return from
a given level of school quality is higher for high-ability students and hence, they will be
willing to outspend low-ability ones. However, in the presence of borrowing constraints
only those with a sufficiently high level of income will be able to attend their preferred
university.
8Public surplus is the sum of the utility of students attending the public university and the utility of
the university. Notice that tuition fees are merely a monetary transfer from students to the university
and thus, they cancel out when these two utilities are aggregated.
9Some private universities in Europe are not profit-maximizers, like religious higher education in-
stitutions. However, we focus our analysis on commercially-run universities which are allowed to seek
profits.
10In our model, exams do not involve any wasteful expenditure in contrast to Fernández (1998).
6
The decision of attending university or remaining uneducated is then affected by uni-
versity’s price. Each individual makes this decision by means of comparing the utility he
enjoys if he acquires education and attends university j, which is given by (1), with the
utility obtained if he remains uneducated, U i0 = wi. Let aˆj be the ability of the student
who is indifferent between attending school j and remaining uneducated, i.e., bU0 = bUj :
aˆj =
pj
Qj
, j = b, v. (4)
All students with ability ai ≥ aˆj prefer to attend university j to remain uneducated.
Among these students, only those with income wi ≥ pj are able to do so due to the
presence of borrowing constraints.
If an individual i is willing to attend university, he must choose which university to
attend comparing his utility at both institutions. In the case in which public school
quality is higher or equal than private quality, Qb ≥ Qv, we may define eab as the ability
of the student who is indifferent between attending the public and the private university,
i.e., eUb = eUv:
eab = pb − pv
Qb −Qv
. (5)
Individuals with ability ai ≥ eab prefer the public to the private university while stu-
dents with ability ai < eab prefer the private to the public institution.11 Alternatively, if
private educational quality is higher than public quality, Qb < Qv, the individual who is
indifferent between both universities is an individual with ability
eav = pv − pb
Qv −Qb
. (6)
3 The Public Monopoly Benchmark
In order to analyze the impact that the presence of private universities may have on public
university’s quality and admission policies, we first consider a benchmark economy in
which the public university is a monopoly in the higher education market. This benchmark
is intended to capture the main features of the higher education market in many European
countries before the entrance of commercial universities into this market.
11It is clear that if pb < pv then eab < 0, which means that all individuals prefer the public to the
private university. This is because the public university is not only of higher quality than the private,
but also cheaper.
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We assume that the public university has an exogenous budget that allows to cover
the costs of educating any chosen number of students. This budget comes from the
government and is funded out of general taxation. The fact that the public university
is not subject to budgetary constraints means that there are no capacity constraints in
the public sector. If we instead consider that the budget at the disposal of the public
university is fixed, the choice of the admission standard would be trivial since the number
of students that the university can admit is determined by this budget.
Public monopoly’s objective is to maximize public surplus, and then, the university
is going to choose the level of school quality and the combination of prices and exams to
attain this objective.12 The timing of decisions is the following: in a first stage, the public
university chooses the level of educational quality, Qb. In a second stage, the university
selects the price or fee, pb. In the last stage, the public institution decides whether to use
a selective exam to admit only students with ability ai ≥ aEb , among those students who
are willing to attend the university, whose ability is ai ≥ aˆb, or admit all applicants. We
solve the surplus-maximization problem by backward induction.
Public university’s utility is given by the following expression:
Ub =
Z 1
pb
Z 1
ab
(aiQb − C(Qb)) da dw, (7)
where ab is the ability of the least able student admitted to the public university.
In the last stage, the public monopoly decides whether to run an exam or not, taking
the price, pb, and educational quality, Qb, as given. This institution determines the
minimum score to be accepted into the university such that the ability of the least able
student, aEb , satisfies the following conditions:
aEb = argmax Ub,
s.t. aEb ≥ bab. (8)
Notice that the exam should select the more talented students among those who are
willing to attend the university, i.e., aEb ≥ bab, otherwise, the exam is useless since it does
not restrict admissions.13
12Notice that public surplus coincides with total surplus when the public university is a monopoly in
the higher education market.
13The ability of the least able student attending the university must also satisfy aEb < 1, otherwise, the
university is so selective that it does not admit any student. Of course, it is in the interest of the public
university to admit a positive measure of students in order to obtain a positive utility and hence, this
condition is always satisfied.
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Given public quality, Qb, and public price, pb, the optimal exam is chosen such that
only students with ability ai ≥ aEb are accepted into the public university, where aEb is the
following:
aEb =
(
C(Qb)
Qb
if pb ≤ C (Qb) ,bab if pb > C (Qb) . (9)
Thus, the public university implements a system of exams if the price chosen in the
previous stage is smaller or equal than the cost per-student, C (Qb) , and chooses only a
system of prices to guide university’s admissions otherwise. The optimal exam is deter-
mined such that the human capital obtained by the least able student admitted to the
public university, aEb Qb, is equal to the cost per-student, C (Qb) .
In the second stage, the university chooses the optimal tuition fee, pb, anticipating the
optimal choice of exams in the next stage, and taking educational quality, Qb, as given.
Thus, the optimal public price satisfies
pb = argmax
Z 1
pb
Z 1
ab
(aiQb − C(Qb)) da dw,
where ab = max
©
aEb , babª.
We find that the price has a negative effect on public university’s utility
dUb
dpb
= −
µ
1− a2b
2
Qb − C (Qb) (1− ab)
¶
+
dab
dpb
(1− pb) (−abQb + C (Qb)) < 0,
since −
³
1−a2b
2
Qb − C (Qb) (1− ab)
´
< 0 and −abQb + C (Qb) ≤ 0 from (9).
Hence, the public university decides to set a zero price, pb = 0, and the selection of
students at this university is guided only by means of exams. Since the public institution
aims at maximizing surplus, exams are preferred to prices to determine admissions since
they are more efficient in allocating students, provided that students’ selection is based on
ability. A system of prices assigns students not only according to their ability (willingness
to attend the university) but also according to their level of income (ability to pay the
university’s fee). The presence of credit constraints prevents the public university from
setting a positive price provided that the tuition fee does restrict the admission of talented
and poor students (those with income wi < pb).
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In the first stage, the public institution chooses school quality anticipating the optimal
choices of prices and exams in the next stages
Qb = argmax
Z 1
0
Z 1
aEb
(aiQb − C(Qb)) da dw. (10)
Public educational quality is optimally determined such that the marginal cost of
school quality is equal to the mean ability of students attending the public university
C 0 (Qb) =
1 + ab
2
, (11)
where ab = aEb =
C(Qb)
Qb
.
Since university’s costs are increasing and convex in quality, the optimal level of public
educational quality is increasing in the mean ability of its student body, 1+ab
2
. This
result points out the positive contribution of students’ abilities to the performance of
the university (the customer-input technology) and provides a theoretical explanation for
the observation that peer-group effects have an important contribution to educational
attainment.14
We can summarize the results obtained in this section as follows: in the presence of
borrowing constraints, the public monopoly uses selective exams and sets a zero price to
determine admissions. On the one hand, the public university chooses the optimal exam
such that the human capital of the least able student accepted into the public university is
equal to the cost per student. On the other hand, the optimal level of educational quality
satisfies that the marginal cost of providing this quality level is equal to the mean ability
of the student body.
4 Competition between a Public and a Private Uni-
versity
Let assume that a public university competes with a private in the higher education
market. We study the following game between institutions: in a first stage, universities
simultaneously determine educational quality, in a second stage, they choose prices, and
in a third stage, once their demand is determined, they decide whether to run an exam or
14The principle finding of the Coleman Report (Coleman et al. (1966)) is that a student’s educational
achievement is strongly and positively correlated to the educational background of his classmates.
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accept all applications. We focus on the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (henceforth,
equilibrium) of the game between universities and we solve the game using backward
induction.
In order to determine the number of market partitions (combinations of prices, quali-
ties and exams) such that both universities may coexist in the higher education market,
we take into account that in the presence of borrowing constraints tuition fees not only
affect the willingness to attend university, given educational quality, but also the ability
of students to pay university’s fees.
Let consider the case in which public quality is higher or equal than private quality,
Qb ≥ Qv. In such case, we have two possibilities; either the public price is lower or is
higher or equal than private price. If the public institution sets a lower price than the
private university, all students prefer to attend the public institution because not only
offers higher quality, but is also cheaper than the private. In this case, the only possible
market partition in which both institutions are active in the market is the one in which the
public university has higher admission standards than the private by means of selective
exams, i.e., aEb > av = max
©bav, aEv ª . Then, some students who are not accepted into
the public university are willing and can afford to attend the private university. These
students are those of ability ai ≥ av and initial income endowment wi ≥ pv. The utility
of the public university is the same as under monopoly because it is the high-quality
institution and then, it is not affected by private university’s decisions. Then, public
utility is given by (7), where ab = aEb , and private university’s utility is the following:
Uv =
Z 1
pv
Z aEb
av
(pv − C(Qv)) da dw, (12)
where av = max{aˆv, aEv }.
Conversely, if the price of the public university is higher or equal than the price of its
private competitor, pb ≥ pv, being public quality higher than private quality, Qb ≥ Qv,
we have two possible situations:
• The first case is the one in which the public university has higher or equal admission
standards than the private, ab ≥ av. Since the public university is the high-quality
institution, its objective function is the same as under monopoly, and is given by
(7), where ab = max
©
aEb , bab, eabª , and private university’s utility is the following:
Uv =
Z pb
pv
Z 1
ab
(pv − C(Qv)) da dw +
Z 1
pv
Z ab
av
(pv − C(Qv)) da dw, (13)
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where av = max
©
aEv , bavª .
• The other market partition is the one in which the private university is more selective
than the public, ab < av, when public school quality is higher or equal than private
quality.15 In such partition the utility of the public university is (7), the same as
under monopoly, while private university’s utility is
Uv =
Z pb
pv
Z 1
av
(pv − C(Qv)) da dw, (14)
where av = max
©bav, aEv ª .
A similar procedure identifies all possible market partitions when private quality is
strictly higher than public quality, Qb < Qv. However, the total number of market
partitions can be further reduced provided that the public university is going to set the
public price optimally at zero in the second stage of the game.16 Hence, students’ selection
in the public university is guided only by exams and then, ab = aEb . This result reduces
the scope of our analysis to the following cases:
• The case in which public quality is higher or equal than private quality, Qb ≥ Qv,
and the public institution has higher or equal admission standards than the private
university, ab ≥ av, (henceforth, Case 1). The allocation of students corresponding
to this case is represented in Figure 1, where the darker area represents enrolments
in the public university.
15Notice that this market partition may appear only if there exist credit constraints and hence, some
high-ability students cannot afford to attend the public university but are able to pay private university’s
fee. Otherwise, high-ability students would outspend low-ability students, independently of their initial
endowment, and hence, the low-quality institution could not attract students of higher mean ability than
the high-quality institution.
16This can be verified easily by observing that the public price has a negative effect on public univer-
sity’s utility in all possible market partitions specified above, taking into account that exams are chosen
optimally in the following stage.
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w
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pv
Figure 1: Case 1
• The case in which the private university provides higher quality than the public,
Qb < Qv, and the public institution is more selective than the private, ab ≥ av
(henceforth, Case 2). The public university may be more selective than the private
when its quality is lower due to the presence of credit constraints. The allocation
of students to the public and private university in this case is represented in Figure
2, where the darker area also represents enrolments in the public institution.
baav a10
w
1
pb
pv
Figure 2: Case 2
• The case in which private quality is higher than public quality, Qb < Qv, and the
private institution is more selective than the public, ab < av (henceforth, Case 3). In
this market partition the private university attracts students of higher mean ability
than the public institution as represented in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Case 3
Let analyze the game between universities in Case 1. We solve the game by backward
induction. We first analyze the last stage of the game, in which universities simultaneously
choose their admission standards using selective exams, and taking the admission standard
of the competitor as given. Since the public institution is the high-quality university, it
is going to choose the admission standard as under monopoly, according to condition (9).
Simultaneously, the private institution selects the requirement for admission, that is,
the ability of the least able student accepted into this institution, aEv , that maximizes
(12), subject to aEv ≥ bav. In doing so, the private university takes the admission standard
in the public university, aEb , as given. It is easy to see that the private university does
not use exams, i.e., aEv = bav, since private university’s utility is strictly decreasing in
av. Hence, the tuition fee is the only instrument used by the private institution to guide
its admission policies. Notice that the price is not only an allocation device, but also
the source of funding for the private institution, which helps explain why the private
institution prefers prices to exams.
In the second stage of the game, universities simultaneously set prices, taking as given
the price of the other institution. As mentioned before, the public institution chooses a
zero-price as under monopoly, since public utility is strictly decreasing in pb. Thus, the
public university only uses exams to guide its admission policies and accepts applications
of students of ability ai ≥ aEb ≡
C(Qb)
Qb
. The private price is chosen to maximize (12), where
av = bav, given the price of the public university. The optimal private price, pv, satisfies
14
the following condition:
(1− 2pv)(aEb − bav) + C (Qv) ¡aEb − bav¢
+dbav
dpv
(1− pv) (−pv + C(Qv)) = 0.
(15)
Strict concavity of private university’s utility in private price ensures the existence of
a unique interior optimum. Hence, we may rewrite (15) in terms of the ability of the least
able student admitted into the private university
bav = (1− pv)
³
aEb +
C(Qv)
Qv
´
− aEb (pv − C (Qv))
2 (1− pv)− (pv − C (Qv))
. (16)
Finally, we solve the first stage of the game, in which universities simultaneously
determine educational quality, taking as given the quality of the competitor. It is easy
to see that the public university chooses quality as under monopoly while the private
institution sets its quality optimally according to the following condition:
−C 0 (Qv)
¡
aEb − bav¢+ d aˆvdQv (−pv + C (Qv)) = 0. (17)
Strict concavity of private university’s utility in private educational quality allows us
to solve (15) for aEb − bav, and plugging it into (17) we obtain the following expression for
optimal private school quality:
C 0 (Qv) = bav µ1− pv − C (Qv)
1− pv
¶
. (18)
Thus, private institution’s quality is increasing in the ability of the least able student
admitted into the private university, bav, since 1− pv−C(Qv)1−pv > 0 from (15). We obtain that
while the public university chooses school quality depending on the mean ability of its
students, 1+a
E
b
2
, the private institution takes into account the ability of the least talented
student accepted, bav.
After solving the game between universities in Case 1, we may state the following
proposition:
Proposition 1 The market partition in which the public university provides higher edu-
cational quality than the private institution is an equilibrium.
Proof. See the Appendix.
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In the proof we use the optimality conditions of qualities, prices and exams for both
universities together with the properties of the cost technology to show first, that public
quality is strictly higher than private, and second, that admissions standards of the public
institution are also higher. This proves that the market partition described in Case 1 is
an equilibrium.
We proceed to solve the game between universities in Cases 2 and 3, characterized
by the private university providing higher quality than the public, and we obtain the
following result:
Proposition 2 There does not exist an equilibrium in which the private university pro-
vides higher quality than the public university.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In the first part of the proof, we show that the private institution cannot provide higher
quality than the public, being less selective, and then, the market partition described in
Case 2 is not an equilibrium. In the second part of the proof, we show that there does
not exist an equilibrium in which the private institution has higher quality and admission
standards than the public university (Case 3). Intuitively, this last result holds because
in the first stage the public institution finds optimal, given private quality, to provide the
monopoly level of school quality. The best response of the private university in the next
stage is to set a price so high that no student is willing to attend this university. This
result may be explained by the admission policy based on tuition fees followed by the
private university, which allows the public institution to affect admissions at the private
university, just varying public school quality. Moreover, the use of exams, combined
with a zero-price policy by the public university allows this institution to preserve its
monopolistic position in the market. The public university is able to attract the best
students while the private can only absorb the residual demand.
From the result stated in Proposition 2 it follows immediately that there exists a
unique equilibrium in the game between universities, and in such equilibrium, the public
university has higher quality than the private. We now turn to investigate the impact that
the presence of a private university has on total welfare compared to public monopoly.
Proposition 3 Competition raises total welfare compared to public monopoly.
Proof. See the Appendix.
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This result follows from the fact that students attending the public university under
monopoly are the same students attending this institution under competition, and they
obtain the same school quality in both cases. The presence of a private university in the
higher education market raises total welfare because some students who did not attend
university in the public monopoly can now educate in the private university. This, in
turn, increases total welfare.
Summarizing, to solve the game between universities we first identify all possible
market partitions in which a public and a private university may compete in the same
market. Since the public university chooses a zero price in all market partitions, the
number of cases of analysis is reduced to just three. Then, we proceed to solve the
game in these cases, and we find that there exists a unique equilibrium in which the
public university has higher quality than the private. We may find a simple explanation
for this result: in the absence of budgetary constraints, the public university chooses
an admission policy, based exclusively on exams, that provides this institution with a
competitive advantage over the private in attracting the best students.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we investigate how the recent expansion of private universities affects the
European higher education market, focusing on the optimal reaction of public universities
to the presence of private institutions, and the potential welfare effects derived from the
creation of new universities. In our analysis, public and private universities have different
objectives; while the public university maximizes public surplus, the private maximizes
profits.
After characterizing all possible configurations of quality, prices and exams in which
both institutions are competing for students in the higher education market, we find
that there exists a unique equilibrium. In such an equilibrium, the public university
always provides higher educational quality than the private institution. This result may
be explained by the admission policy chosen by the public, based on exams and no fees,
versus the price policy followed by the private institution. Our results point out that
the use of exams not only allows the public university to behave as a monopoly but also
prevents the private institution from providing a higher quality than the public university.
The fact that public universities are not subject to budgetary constraints is crucial
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in explaining the inability of private institutions to attract the best students. In this
situation, the public sector can preserve its monopolistic position in the market. We
believe that our results fit quite well the main features of the higher education market
in many European countries, characterized by the presence of public universities using
primarily exams to allocate their students, and providing higher quality than private
institutions.
However, we do observe that in European countries there are also some private univer-
sities with higher admission standards than public institutions. The existence of objectives
different from profit maximization in some private institutions (such as Catholic univer-
sities) may help explain this observation. In the context of our model, the relaxation of
the hypothesis on the absence of budgetary constraints in funding public institutions may
lead to an equilibrium in which private institutions provide higher quality than public
ones.
Finally, we cannot ignore that the European higher education market may change dra-
matically in the following years. Sluggish economic performance and high unemployment
in Europe have restricted the funding available for higher education and some countries
have initiated, or plan to initiate, processes of “privatization” of public higher educa-
tion. These tendencies are expected to affect competition between public and private
universities. We leave these issues for further research.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We prove the existence of this equilibrium. Firstly, we show
that Qb > Qv. From (9) and (11), we obtain that public educational quality is given by
the following expression:
C 0 (Qb) =
1 + C(Qb)
Qb
2
. (19)
Since the cost function is increasing and convex in quality, then Qb > Qv if and only
if C 0 (Qb) > C 0 (Qv) . From the condition for optimal private quality, given by (18), we
obtain that C 0 (Qv) < av and then, a sufficient condition for Qb > Qv is
av <
1 + C(Qv)
Qv
2
.
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From (15) and the existence of an interior optimal private price, we obtain that 1 −
2pv + C (Qv) > 0, and then, the private price is increasing in selectivity at the public
university, given by aEb . Since a
E
b < 1, the following inequality holds:
av ≤
(1− pv)
³
1 + C(Qv)
Qv
´
− (pv − C (Qv))
2 (1− pv)− (pv − C (Qv))
<
1 + C(Qv)
Qv
2
.
Hence, C 0 (Qb) > C 0 (Qv) which implies that Qb > Qv.
Secondly, we can show that the public institution is more selective than the private,
i.e., aEb > av, where av is given by (16), if the following condition is satisfied:
aEb >
(1− pv)
³
aEb +
C(Qv)
Qv
´
− aEb (pv − C (Qv))
2 (1− pv)− (pv − C (Qv))
⇔ aEb >
C (Qv)
Qv
.
The above inequality holds since we know from (9) that aEb =
C(Qb)
Qb
, and Qb > Qv
implies that C(Qb)
Qb
> C(Qv)
Qv
provided that C(Q)
Q
is strictly increasing in Q. Hence, aEb > av.
Proof of Proposition 2. We prove that in equilibrium, the private university does
not provide a quality higher than the public university. We start showing that Qb < Qv,
pb < pv and ab ≥ av (Case 2) is not an equilibrium. Let assume that Qb < Qv, pb < pv
and ab ≥ av. Hence, the objective functions of the public and the private university are
respectively:
Ub =
Z pv
pb
Z 1
ab
(aiQb − C(Qb)) da dw, (20)
Uv =
Z 1
pv
Z 1
av
(pv − C (Qv)) da dw, (21)
where ab = max {aEb , aˆb} and av = max
©
aEv , aˆv, eavª .
We solve the game backwards; in the last stage of the game, it is easy to see that the
public institution is going to choose exams as under monopoly: aEb =
C(Qb)
Qb
. The private
institution does not use exams because its utility is strictly decreasing in av. In the second
stage of the game, the public institution finds optimal to set a public price equal to zero,
while the private university chooses its price as follows:
(1− av) (1− 2pv + C (Qv))−
dav
dpv
(1− pv) (pv − C (Qv)) = 0, (22)
where av = eav since pb = 0 and then, eav > bav.
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In the first stage of the game, both universities choose educational quality simultane-
ously. The private university behaves as a monopoly and private quality is determined
according to this condition:
C 0 (Qv) =
av
1− av
µ
av −
C (Qv)
Qv −Qb
¶
, (23)
Optimal quality satisfies C 0 (Qv) > 0 if and only if av− C(Qv)Qv−Qb > 0. Notice that
C(Qv)
Qv−Qb >
C(Qv)
Qv
and C(Q)
Q
is increasing in Q. Thus, we obtain that if Qb < Qv then
C(Qb)
Qb
< C(Qv)
Qv
,
which implies that ab < av, provided that ab = aEb =
C(Qb)
Qb
. This contradicts ab ≥ av and
then, the market partition described in Case 2 is not an equilibrium.
Now we turn to show that the market partition characterized by Qb < Qv, pb < pv
and av > ab (Case 3) is not an equilibrium either. The utility of the public university is
the following:
Ub =
Z pv
pb
Z 1
av
(aiQb − C (Qb)) da dw +
Z 1
pb
Z av
ab
(aiQb − C(Qb)) da dw, (24)
where ab = max {aEb , bab} and av = max{aEv , eav, bav}.
Private university’s utility is the following:
Uv =
Z 1
pv
Z 1
av
(pv − C (Qv)) da dw. (25)
The public institution chooses exams optimally as under monopoly, according to (9) .
The private institution does not use exams since private utility is strictly decreasing in
av. Optimal public prices are zero since public utility is strictly decreasing in pb:
dUb
dQb
= −(1− a
2
v)
2
Qb −
(a2v − ab)
2
Qb + C (Qb) (1− ab)
+
dab
dpb
(1− pb) (−abQb + C (Qb))
+dav
dpb
(1− pv) (avQb − C (Qb)) < 0,
(26)
since −(1− a
2
v)
2
Qb −
a2v − ab
2
Qb + C (Qb) (1− ab) < 0,
dab
dpb
≥ 0, −abQb + C (Qb) ≤ 0,
dav
dpb
< 0 and (avQb − C (Qb)) > 0, since av > aEb =
C(Qb)
Qb
.
The optimal private price is determined by (22) , where av = eav = pvQv−Qb . The ability
of the least able student accepted into the private university may be written as follows:
bav = (1− pv)
³
1 + C(Qv)
Qv−Qb
´
− (pv − C (Qv))
2 (1− pv)− (pv − C (Qv))
. (27)
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From (27), we observe that some students are willing to attend the private university,
i.e., bav < 1, if and only if public quality is sufficiently low compared to private quality:
Qb ≤ Qv − C (Qv).
Educational quality at the private university is chosen according to the following con-
dition:
C 0(Qv) = eav µ1− pv − C (Qv)
1− pv
¶
.
Public university’s utility may be written as follows:
Ub =



R pv
pb
R 1eav(aiQb − C (Qb)) da dw
+
R 1
pb
R eav
aEb
(aiQb − C(Qb)) da dw if Qb < Qv − C (Qv) ,R 1
pb
R 1
aEb
(aiQb − C(Qb)) da dw if Qb ≥ Qv − C (Qv) .
(28)
Note that if Qb < Qv − C (Qv) , then, eav < 1 from (27) . On the contrary, if public
quality is sufficiently high, Qb ≥ Qv−C (Qv) , then eav = 1 and thus, the public university
is a monopoly in the market. We identify this threshold level of public quality as Qb ≡
Qv − C (Qv) .
Note first that public utility under monopoly is higher than under competition:Z 1
pb
Z 1
aEb
(aiQb − C(Qb))dadw ≥
R pv
pb
R 1eav(aiQb − C (Qb)) da dw
+
R 1
pb
R eav
aEb
(aiQb − C(Qb)) da dw
,∀Qb ∈
¡
0, Qb
¤
,
since eav ≤ 1 and the utility of the public university under competition is increasing in the
ability of the least able student in the private university, eav.
We now turn to show that it is optimal for the public university, given private quality,
to choose a level of quality that kicks the private institution out of the market. The
argument of the proof is the following: if the minimum level of quality required to expel
the private institution from the market (and become a monopoly), Qb, is smaller or
equal than optimal quality at monopoly, Qmb , we can prove that there does not exist an
equilibrium with the private institution providing higher quality than the public. Given
private quality, it is optimal for the public university to provide the monopoly level of
school quality, Qmb , and this level is sufficiently high to expel the private university from
the market.
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We proceed to show thatQmb ≥ Qb for all possible levels of private quality, Qv. Optimal
quality under monopoly, Qmb , is determined optimally by the following condition:
C 0(Qb) =
1 + C(Qb)
Qb
2
, (29)
where C (Qb) = αQkb , k > 1, α > 0. Therefore, substituting C (Qb) and
dC(Qb)
dQb
, we solve
(29) for Qmb :
Qmb =
µ
1
α (2k − 1)
¶ 1
k−1
. (30)
The minimum level of public quality required for the public university to become a
monopoly is Qb = Qv − C (Qv) , and this level is maximum when private quality, Qv,
satisfies, C 0 (Qv) = 1. In this case, Qb is the following:
Qb =
µ
1
αk
¶ 1
k−1
µ
1− 1
k
¶
. (31)
We prove that Qmb ≥ Qb if the following condition holds:
¡
2k−1
k
¢ 1
k−1
¡
1− 1
k
¢
≤ 1. The
above inequality holds since
¡
2k−1
k
¢ 1
k−1
¡
1− 1
k
¢
is strictly increasing in k and
limk→∞
¡
2k−1
k
¢ 1
k−1
¡
1− 1
k
¢
= 1, and thus, Qmb ≥ Qb. Therefore, this equilibrium does not
exist.
Proof of Proposition 3. Total welfare raises with respect to the public monopoly
if the surplus generated by the private university, Sv, is positive:
Sv =
Z 1
pv
Z aEb
bav (aiQv − C (Qv)) da > 0. (32)
Notice that Sv > 0 if and only if
aEb +bav
2
> C(Qv)
Qv
. Using the expression for bav given by
(16), we obtain that a
E
b +bav
2
> C(Qv)
Qv
if and only if aEb >
C(Qv)
Qv
. The properties of the cost
function ensures that aEb =
C(Qb)
Qb
> C(Qv)
Qv
provided that Qb > Qv and hence, Sv > 0.
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